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ABSTRACT
Batch normalization (BN) has been widely used in modern deep neural networks
(DNNs) due to fast convergence. BN is observed to increase the model accuracy
while at the cost of adversarial robustness. We conjecture that the increased adver-
sarial vulnerability is caused by BN shifting the model to rely more on non-robust
features (NRFs). Our exploration finds that other normalization techniques also
increase adversarial vulnerability and our conjecture is also supported by analyz-
ing the model corruption robustness and feature transferability. With a classifier
DNN defined as a feature set F we propose a framework for disentangling F ro-
bust usefulness into F usefulness and F robustness. We adopt a local linearity
based metric, termed LIGS, to define and quantify F robustness. Measuring the
F robustness with the LIGS provides direct insight on the feature robustness shift
independent of usefulness. Moreover, the LIGS trend during the whole training
stage sheds light on the order of learned features, i.e. from RFs (robust features) to
NRFs, or vice versa. Our work analyzes how BN and other factors influence the
DNN from the feature perspective. Prior works mainly adopt accuracy to evaluate
their influence regarding F usefulness, while we believe evaluating F robustness
is equally important, for which our work fills the gap.
1 INTRODUCTION
Batch normalization (BN) (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015) has been considered as a milestone technique in
the development of deep neural networks (DNNs) pushing the frontier in computer vision due to fast
convergence. We evaluate the behaviour of the models with and without BN in Table 1, as expected,
BN improves the clean accuracy, i.e. accuracy on clean images. However, this improvement comes
at the cost of lower robust accuracy, i.e. accuracy on adversarial images (Szegedy et al., 2013).
Table 1: Comparison of models with and w/o
BN on accuracy and robustness
Network Acc PGD l2 PGD l∞ CW l2 CW l∞
0.25 1/255 0.25 1/255
Im
ag
eN
et
VGG16 (None) 71.59 15.55 1.79 16.66 0.23
VGG16 (BN) 73.37 6.04 0.55 6.82 0.02
VGG19 (None) 72.38 16.52 2.18 17.46 0.30
VGG19 (BN) 74.24 6.94 0.69 7.66 0.03
ResNet18 (None) 66.51 30.44 1.24 30.43 0.93
ResNet18 (BN) 70.50 16.79 0.14 17.40 0.07
ResNet50 (None) 71.60 28.00 2.17 28.26 0.88
ResNet50 (BN) 76.54 19.50 0.53 20.19 0.19
SV
H
N
VGG11 (None) 95.42 63.91 83.20 64.64 83.24
VGG11 (BN) 96.27 51.22 77.50 51.13 77.61
VGG16 (None) 95.76 62.24 82.76 62.97 82.92
VGG16 (BN) 96.43 52.90 80.24 52.88 79.93
C
IF
A
R
10
VGG11 (None) 90.06 51.30 70.47 51.75 70.40
VGG11 (BN) 92.48 39.31 63.87 39.04 63.85
VGG16 (None) 91.89 34.01 63.18 34.37 63.46
VGG16 (BN) 93.7 28.61 56.05 24.01 54.58
ResNet50 (None) 92.15 29.24 49.33 17.09 49.24
ResNet50 (BN) 95.6 9.15 36.37 8.72 36.64
One recent work (Ilyas et al., 2019) has shown that
adversarial vulnerability can be attributed to highly
predictive yet brittle non-robust features (NRFs) that
are inherent to the (training) dataset. Under their
feature framework (Ilyas et al., 2019), the (train-
ing) dataset contains robust features (RFs) and non-
robust features (NRFs) that are both useful for classi-
fication. Given the observation that BN increases ad-
versarial vulnerability in Table 1, their finding (Ilyas
et al., 2019) motivates us to explore BN from the
feature robustness perspective, towards explaining
the increased adversarial vulnerability. Given NRFs
are predictive (higher accuracy) yet brittle (lower ro-
bustness), we conjecture that BN shifts the model to
rely more on NRFs than RFs for classification. We
explore BN and similar normalization techniques
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and find that they increase adversarial vulnerability in standard training. Moreover, our conjecture
is also corroborated by the analysis of corruption robustness and feature transferability.
Given both RFs and NRFs are useful, it would be desirable to have a metric to measure “pure”
robustness independent of usefulness for providing direct evidence on the shift towards NRFs. To
this end, with a classifier DNN defined as a feature set F , we propose a framework for disentangling
F robust usefulness into F usefulness and F robustness. F usefulness and F robust usefulness
can be measured by clean accuracy and robust accuracy, respectively. To measure F robustness,
we adopt a metric termed Local Input Gradient Similarity (LIGS) (see Sec. 3.1), measuring the
local linearity of a DNN as an indication for feature robustness. Note that these metrics describe
the entire feature set of a DNN instead of any single feature. We find that BN (or IN/LN/GN)
reduces F robustness, which naturally explains the lower robust accuracy caused by them. With
this disentangled representation, we investigate and compare the behaviour of models trained on
dataset that mainly has either RFs or NRFs, which shows that NRFs are difficult to learn w/o BN
suggesting BN is essential for learning NRFs. Further investigation on the dataset with RFs and
NRFs conflicting for different classification reveals that the model learns first RFs and then NRFs,
and the previous learned RFs can be partially forgotten while the model learns NRFs in the later
stage. Beyond normalization, we also analyze other network structure and optimization factors,
most of which have no significant influence on F robustness. Analyzing the various techniques that
stabilize training suggests stabilizing training does necessarily lead to lower LIGS.
2 RELATED WORK
Normalization in DNNs. BN performs normalization along batch dimension to speed-up train-
ing (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015). The stochasticity of the batch statistics also serves as a regularizer and
improves generalization (Luo et al., 2018). However, the property of batch dependence makes BN
not appropriate when a large batch size is impractical (Ba et al., 2016). Moreover, the pre-computed
mean and variance from the training dataset might not be feasible to the test dataset especially when
there are domain changes (Rebuffi et al., 2017). To avoid such an issue due to the batch dimension,
several alternative normalization techniques have been proposed to exploit the channel dimension,
such as layer normalization (LN) (Ba et al., 2016). Instance normalization (IN) (Ulyanov et al.,
2016) has been explored for style transfer. Group normalization (GN) in (Wu & He, 2018) performs
normalization for C/G channels, where C indicates the number of total channels of a certain layer
and G indicates the number of groups. LN and IN can be seen as two special cases of GN with G set
to 1 or N, respectively (Wu & He, 2018). Different from BN, GN does not require a pre-computed
mean and variance as BN. In essence, BN, LN, IN and GN are no more complex than performing a
normalization on the intermediate layers, despite the difference of normalization dimension. Con-
current to (Galloway et al., 2019) showing BN increases adversarial vulnerability, our work finds
that LN/IN/GN mirrors the same trend.
Adversarial Vulnerability. Adversarial examples have attracted significant attention in machine
learning (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014), which raises concern for improving ro-
bust accuracy (Carlini & Wagner, 2017). The cause of adversarial vulnerability have been ex-
plored from different perspectives, such as local linearity (Goodfellow et al., 2014), input high-
dimension (Gilmer et al., 2018; Shafahi et al., 2018; Mahloujifar et al., 2019), limited sam-
ple (Schmidt et al., 2018; Tanay & Griffin, 2016), boundary tilting (Tanay & Griffin, 2016), test error
in noise (Fawzi et al., 2016; Ford et al., 2019; Cohen et al., 2019), etc. Some explanations might con-
flict with other explanations (Akhtar & Mian, 2018). Recently, the cause of adversarial vulnerability
has also been explained from feature perspective (Ilyas et al., 2019). In adversarial machine learning,
both accuracy and robustness are important for evaluating the model performace (Carlini & Wagner,
2017). Despite many efforts to bridge their gap (Zhang et al., 2019a), it is widely recognized that
there is a trade-off between them Tsipras et al. (2018). Regardless of this trade-off, our work shows
that robustness can be influenced by both clean accuracy and feature robustness, which provides
insight on why normalization like BN decreases robust accuracy despite higher clean accuracy.
2
3 NORMALIZATION IN DNN: THE MODEL RELIES MORE ON RFS OR NRFS?
3.1 FEATURE PERSPECTIVE ON THE INCREASED ADVERSARIAL VULNERABILITY
Santurkar et al. explored how BN helps optimization, revealing that BN smooths the optimization
landscape instead of reducing internal covariate shift (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015). Given that DNN
learns a set of features (Ilyas et al., 2019), this improved optimization is expected to lead to a model
with more useful features, consequently improving the accuracy in standard training. The byproduct
of increasing adversarial vulnerability needs explanation. The cause of adversarial vulnerability has
been attributed to the existence of NRFs in the (training) dataset (Ilyas et al., 2019), which motivates
us to explore the increased adversarial vulnerability from the feature perspective.
Features in DNN: RFs vs. NRFs. Feature is one of the most widely used terms in computer vision.
Hand-crafted feature design (Lowe, 2004; Dalal & Triggs, 2005) was essential for many vision
tasks until deep learning gained popularity, shifting the trend to exploit DNNs to extract features
automatically. Despite different interpretations, there is folklore belief that a classification DNN can
be perceived as a function utilizing useful features (Ilyas et al., 2019). Specifically, Ilyas et al. define
a feature to be a function mapping from the input space X to real numbers, i.e. f : X → IR, and the
set of all features is thus F = {f}. A feature f is ρ-useful (ρ > 0) if it is correlated with the true
label in expectation, i.e. IE(x,y)∼D[y · f(x)] ≥ ρ. Given a ρ-useful feature f , robust features (RFs)
and non-robust features (NRFs) are formally defined as follows:
• Robust feature: a feature f is robust if there exists a γ > 0 for it to be γ-robustly useful
under some specified set of valid perturbations ∆, i.e. IE(x,y)∼D[ inf
δ∈∆(x)
y · f(x+ δ)] ≥ γ.
• Non-robust feature: a feature f is non-robust if γ > 0 does not exist.
Conjecture. With the above feature framework, we conjecture that BN shifts the model to rely more
on NRFs instead of RFs.
3.2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The observation in Table 1 constitutes an important yet isolate evidence for our conjecture, which
can be corroborated as follows. First, BN is no more complex than normalizing the DNN interme-
diate feature layers; thus if our conjecture is correct, other normalization techniques (such as LN,
IN and GN) are also likely to mirror the same behaviour. Second, with the link (Ford et al., 2019)
between adversarial robustness and corruption robustness, our conjecture can be more convincing
if the corruption robustness phenomenon also supports it. Third, given RFs transfer better, extra
evidence can be provided with feature transferability analysis.
Table 2: Influence of various normalization techniques on ac-
curacy (left/) and robustness (/right).
Data Network None BN IN LN GN
SVHN VGG11 95.42/63.91 96.27/51.22 95.89/45.82 96.29/56.77 96.30/56.37VGG16 95.76/62.24 96.43/52.90 96.64/47.43 96.18/59.55 96.21/59.50
CIFAR10
VGG11 90.06/51.30 92.48/39.31 88.42/31.38 90.54/42.41 90.68/39.43
VGG16 91.89/34.02 93.70/28.61 90.73/13.44 92.51/28.92 92.83/26.73
ResNet50 92.15/29.24 95.60/9.15 93.40/10.80 90.37/7.24 92.61/6.43
ImageNet ResNet18 66.51/30.44 70.50/16.79 63.14/14.29 68.36/19.72 69.02/19.76ResNet50 71.60/28.00 76.54/19.50 67.97/13.65 71.08/17.38 74.69/20.34
Adversarial robustness. Table 2
shows that the phenomenon of in-
creased adversarial vulnerability
is not limited to BN but also to IN,
LN, GN. Overall, except the result
of ResNet50 on CIFAR10, IN con-
sistently achieves the lowest ro-
bust accuracy. We suspect that this
can be attributed to the prior find-
ing (Ulyanov et al., 2016; Nam &
Kim, 2018) that IN excludes style information by performing instance-wise normalization. The style
information are likely RFs (note that changing style, color for instance, normally requires large pixel
instensity change), thus IN discarding style can result in the least robust model.
Ford et al. revealed that adversarial training (and Gaussian data augmentation) significantly im-
prove the robustness against noise corruptions, i.e. Gaussian/Speckle/Shot, while decrease the ro-
bustness against contrast and fog, which is confirmed in Figure 1. Following (Ilyas et al., 2019),
a standard model is perceived to learn a sufficient amount of NRFs, while a robust model (robus-
tified through adversarial training) mainly has RFs. Perceiving from the feature perspective, the
following explanation arises: noise corruptions mainly corrupt the NRFs while contrast and fog
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mainly corrupt the RFs. Our explanation from the feature perspective echos with prior explana-
tion from a frequency perspective (Yin et al., 2019). We discuss their link in Appendix Sec. A.
Figure 1: Corruption robustness of VGG16 with standard train-
ing (left) and adversarial training (right)
Corruption robustness. We
find that the model without
normalization is more robust
to noise corruptions than their
counterparts with normalization
while a reverse trend is observed
for fog and contrast. Given our
explanation, this contrasting be-
havior suggests that the models
with normalization learn more
NRFs instead of RFs. Another observation from Figure 1 is that IN leads to extra high-robustness
against contrast corruption, suggesting less IN is the least dependent on RFs in this context. This
aligns well with the adversarial robustness result that model with IN is generally the least robust.
Table 3: Cross-evaluation of the features extracted
from source models on target models with the base-
line VGG16. The left reports the results for standard
models, and the right for adversarially trained models.
Target
Source None BN IN LN GN
None − 45.6 29.6 52.1 45.9
BN 75.3 − 35.8 58.9 54.3
IN 66.1 50.4 − 53.0 61.9
LN 79.4 59.4 37.9 − 63.4
GN 73.3 54.4 43.1 61.3 −
Target
Source None BN IN LN GN
None − 85.0 59.8 75.8 65.9
BN 81.3 − 58.1 73.7 62.5
IN 75.8 78.8 − 69.4 62.9
LN 82.9 84.5 60.0 − 64.8
GN 80.7 83.7 63.8 73.7 −
Feature Transferability. We extract the
features out of the trained models as a
new dataset and perform cross-evaluation
on the remaining models (details in Ap-
pendix B.3). The results are shown in Ta-
ble 3 (left). As a control study, we perform
the same analysis on adversarially trained
robust models, see Table 3 (right). It has
been shown in (Salman et al., 2020) that
robust models are superior to normally
trained models for transfer learning, which
demonstrates that RFs can transfer better. Here, we find that features extracted from robust models
(right) can transfer better among than the features extracted from standard models (left). For the
normally trained models, we observe that the features extracted from the model w/o normalization
transfer better (indicated in bold) than those models with BN/IN/LN/GN, especially IN. Recogniz-
ing the extracted features have both RF and NRFs, our observation suggests that the models with
normalization rely more on NRFs than that w/o BN.
4 DISENTANGLING USEFULNESS AND ROBUSTNESS OF MODEL FEATURES
With the above evidence to corroborate our conjecture that BN shifts the model to rely more on
NRFs, it would be desirable to have a metric to measure “pure” robustness independent of useful-
ness. Given both RFs/NRFs are useful and their core difference lies in robustness, such a metric is
crucial for providing direct evidence on the shift towards NRFs by showing a lower “pure” robust-
ness. Moreover, the LIGS trend during the whole training stage also sheds light on the learned order
of features, i.e. from RFs to NRFs or vice versa. Evaluating adversarial robustness by robust accu-
racy demonstrates how robustly useful the model features are. Thus, disentangling robust usefulness
into usefulness and robustness provides a better understanding of adversarial robustness.
4.1 FRAMEWORK FOR DISENTANGLING USEFULNESS AND ROBUSTNESS
Following (Ilyas et al., 2019), we define a DNN classifier as a set of features, i.e. F = {f}. The
definitions of f usefulness and robust usefulness in Sec. 3.1 can be readily extended to F .
• F usefulness: F is ρ-useful (ρ > 0) if it is correlated with the true label in expectation, i.e.
IE(x,y)∼D[y · F (x)] ≥ ρ;
• F robust usefulness: F is γ-robustly useful if there exists a γ > 0 under some specified set
of valid perturbations ∆, i.e. IE(x,y)∼D[ inf
δ∈∆(x)
y · F (x+ δ)] ≥ γ.
For being orthogonal to usefulness, we can not trivially define F robustness by measuring its correla-
tion with the true label in expectation. With a locally quadratic approximation, prior work (Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2019) provided theoretical evidence of a strong relationship between robustness and
local linearity. Thus, we define F robustness as follows.
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• F robustness: A feature set F is β-robust if the local linearity is large than β (β > 0), i.e.
IE(x,y)∼D,ν∼∆ [dist(∇l(x, y),∇l(x+ ν, y))] ≥ β.
The local linearity indicated by the distance (dist) between ∇(l(x, y) and ∇l(x + ν, y) can be
represented in different forms, such as calculating the norm of their difference (Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al., 2019). We adopt the cosine similarity (Zhang et al., 2020) to quantify this distance as:
E(x,y)∼D,ν∼∆
[ ∇l(x, y) · ∇l(x+ ν, y)
‖∇l(x, y)‖ · ‖∇l(x+ ν, y)‖
]
. (1)
The adopted distance metric indicates similarity (or linearity) between the original and locally per-
turbed input gradient and is thus termed Local Input Gradient Similarity (LIGS).
Perturbation choice of LIGS. We investigate the influence of perturbation type by setting ν to
Figure 2: Trend of LIGS with different perturbations: Gaus-
sian, Uniform, FGSM, PGD (left to right).
Gaussian noise, uniform noise,
FGSM perturbation and PGD per-
turbation (details in Appendix B.4)
and the results are shown in Figure 2.
Among all the chosen types of
perturbation, we observe a general
trend that the LIGS decreases with
training and consistently the LIGS
w/o BN is higher than that with BN.
Unless specified, we sample the ν from a Gaussian distribution to measure the LIGS in this work.
Relation to prior works. The primary motivation of adopting LIGS in this work is to define and
quantify the F robustness. Directly maximizing the local linearity as a new regularizer has been
shown to improve adversarial robustness on par with adversarial training (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.,
2019). A similar finding has also been shown in (Qin et al., 2019). Note that “adversarial robustness”
mostly refers to “robust usefulness” instead of pure “robustness”. To avoid confusion, we highlight
that F robustness is orthogonal to usefulness. Contrary to the prior works (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.,
2019; Qin et al., 2019), which improve “adversarial robustness” by investigating (and establishing)
the link between robust usefulness with local linearity, we adopt the local linearity as a measure of
pure “robustness”. By definition, local linearity does not imply usefulness because it is not related to
the correlation with the true label. Nonetheless, their observation that maximizing local linearity can
help improve robust usefulness (measured by robust accuracy), can be seen as a natural consequence
of increasing F robustness.
Figure 3: Schematic of disentangling F
usefulness and robustness with ball color
representing robust usefulness, i.e. the
darker, the more robustly useful. Ball size
indicates usefulness while red line divides
RFs and NRFs.
Interpretation and relationship. Informally but intu-
itively, the usefulness of F can be perceived as the num-
ber of features if we assume that each feature is equally
useful for classification; and the robustness of F can
be seen as the ratio of RFs to NRFs in F . This is il-
lustrated schematically in Fig. 3, where a DNN located
in the top right region has high robust usefulness, i.e.
high robust accuracy, indicating the model learns suf-
ficient features and among them a high percentage be-
longs to RFs. A low robust accuracy can be caused by
either low F usefulness or low F robustness. Fig. 3 also
shows the difference between standard training (green)
and adversarial training (blue). Both start from the state
of high F robustness and low F usefulness; compared
with standard training, adversarial training eventually
leads to a model of higher F robustness and lower F
usefulness. For standard training, removing BN also
increases F robustness. By definition, F robustness, F
usefulness and F robust usefulness can be measured by
LIGS, clean accuracy and robust accuracy, respectively.
The schematic illustration in Fig. 3 aligns well with the results in Fig. 4.
The overall trend in Fig. 4 shows that robust accuracy is influenced by both clean accuracy and
LIGS. For example, for adversarial (adv.) training, the LIGS stays close to 1 during the whole
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training stage, and the robust accuracy is highly influenced by the clean accuracy. For standard
(std.) training, however, the LIGS is much lower, leading to a much smaller robust accuracy de-
spite slightly higher clean accuracy. The influence of BN is mainly observed on LIGS. During the
whole training stage, BN leads to a significantly lower LIGS, consequently lower robust accuracy.
Figure 4: Trend of clean accuracy, robust accuracy, LIGS
with ResNet18 on CIFAR10.
As (standard) training evolves, the
LIGS value decreases, i.e. the feature
robustness decreases, suggesting the
model relies more NRFs as training
evolves. The influence of BN in adv
training is, however, is very limited.
Here, only BN on CIFAR10 is re-
ported. We provide more results re-
sults with IN/LN/GN and results on
ImageNet in Appendix C and Ap-
pendix D. The results mirror the trend
in Fig. 4.
Figure 5: Effect of regularizing LIGS.
Regularization of LIGS. The above
results show that there is a strong link
between robust accuracy and LIGS. To
further verify the link between them,
we use LIGS as a regularizer during
training. The results in Figure 5 con-
firm that increasing LIGS through regu-
larization improves the robust accuracy
by a large margin despite small influ-
ence on clean accuracy.
4.2 TRAINING ON DATASET OF DISENTAGLED RFS AND NRFS
It is worth mentioning that by default the experiment setup is the same by only changing the variable
of interest (e.g. testing with and wihtout BN). Training on dataset of disentagled RFs and NRFs with
BN as the control variable highlights the effect of BN on them while excluding mutual influence.
Figure 6: Analysis of BN with ResNet18 on datasets of dis-
entangled features.
Disentangling RFs and NRFs. Fol-
lowing the procedure of Ilyas et al.
we extract D̂R, D̂NR and D̂rand (De-
scription in Appendix E). Note that
D̂R mainly (if not exclusively) has
RFs, while D̂rand only has NRFs.
D̂NR has both RFs and NRFs (see
Appendix E for results on D̂NR).
Here, to demonstrate the effect of BN
on either NRFs or NRFs, we report the results trained on D̂R and D̂rand in Fig. 6 , where the clean
accuracy and robust accuracy results echo the findings in (Ilyas et al., 2019). There are two major
observations regarding the LIGS result. First, the LIGS on D̂R is very high (more then 0.9), which
explains why a model (normally) trained on D̂R has relatively high robust accuracy, while the LIGS
on D̂rand eventually becomes very low because D̂rand only has NRFs. Second, w/o BN, the model
is found to not converge on D̂rand, leading to 10% accuracy, i.e. equivalent to random guess. The
model with BN starts to converge (achieving accuracy of higer than 10%) after around 25 epochs and
the LIGS is observed to increase before the model starts converging. This suggests that the model
is learning features that are robust yet hardly useful. This “warmup” phenomenon is not accidental
and repeatedly happens with different random training seeds. After the model starts to converge, the
LIGS plummets to a very low value quickly.
Training on a dataset of conflicting RFs and NRFs. In the original dataset D, abundant RFs
and NRFs co-exist and the model learns both for classification. It is interesting to understand the
order of the learned feature, i.e. from RFs to NRFs or vice versa, as well their influence on each
6
other. The decreasing trend of LIGS in Fig. 4 suggests that the model learns mainly RFs first.
Here, we provide another evidence with the metric of clean accuracy. In the D, RFs and NRFs
are cued for the same classfication, thus no insight can be deduced from the clean accuracy. To
this end, we design a dataset D̂Conflict of conflicting RFs and NRFs. Specifically, we exploit the
generated D̂R of target class t as the starting images and generate the NRFs of target class of t+ 1.
In other words, in the D̂Conflict RFs are cued for class t while NRFs are cued for class t + 1.
Figure 7: Analysis on dataset with Con-
flicting RFs and NRFs.
Figure 7 shows that with BN the clean accuracy aligned
with RFs increases significantly in the first few epochs
and peaks around 80% followed by a sharp decrease,
while the accuracy aligned with NRFs slowly increases
until saturation. It supports that the model learns from
RFs to NRFs. Eventually, the accuracy aligned with
NRFs surpasses that aligned with RFs, indicating the
model forgets most of the first learned RFs during the
later stage. W/o BN, we find that the model in the whole
stage learns RFs while ignores NRFs. It clearly shows
that BN is crucial for learning NRFs, which naturally explains why BN shifts the models towards
learning more NRFs. We also discuss the results of D̂det (Ilyas et al., 2019) in Appendix E.
4.3 EXPLORATION BEYOND (BATCH) NORMALIZATION
Network structure factors and optimization factors. Besides normalization, other factors could
influence the DNN behavior, especially concerning its robustness. We study two categories of fac-
tors: (a) structure category including network width, network depth, and ReLu variants; (b) opti-
mization category including weight decay, initial learning rate, optimizer. The results are presented
in Figure 8. We find that most of them have no significant influence on LIGS. Increasing network
Figure 8: Influence of other factors on the behavior or DNN
width and depth can increase or decrease the LIGS, respectively, but by a small margin. No vis-
ible difference between ReLU and Leaky ReLU can be observed, while SeLU leads to a slightly
higher LIGS with lower clean accuracy. Some candidates from the optimization category are found
to influence F robustness differently in the early and later stage of training. High weight decay
leads to higher LIGS in the early stages of training and slightly lower in the end. A higher initial
learning rate, such as 0.5, results in higher LIGS in the early training stage, but eventually leads to
lower LIGS. For both weight decay and initial learning rate, an opposite trend of lower/higher in
the early/later stage is observed with clean accuracy. SGD optimizer and ADAGrad show similar
behavior on LIGS, ADAM leads to slightly higher LIGS. There infliuence on the clean accuracy is
more significant.
4.4 DOES STABLIZING TRAINING LEAD TO LOWER F ROBUSTNESS?
Given our observation that the model w/o BN cannot converge on dataset with only NRFs and
wide belief that BN stabilizes training, we are wondering potential link between stability and F
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robustness. ResNet shortcut also stabilizes/accelerates training (He et al., 2016), thus we investigate
whether it reduces F robustness. Fig. 9 shows that shortcut has trivial influence on LIGS with
ResNet20. For a much deeper ResNet56, removing the shortcut has significant influence on LIGS
in the early stage of training, however, eventually the influence also becomes marginal.
Figure 9: Effect of shortcut (left) and FixupIni (right) on model.
Fixup initialization (FixupIni)
is introduced in (Zhang et al.,
2019b) to replace the BN in
ResNets. We compare their in-
fluence on the model and ob-
serve that their difference on
clean accuracy is trivial, while
BN leads to lower LIGS than
FixupIni. Overall, it shows in-
creasing training stability does not necessarily lead to lower F robustness. Santurkar et al. have
shown that BN leads to more predictive and stable features. Following the procedure in (Santurkar
et al., 2018), we visualize the gradient predictiveness and find BN leads to more stable and predic-
tive gradients. We observe that shorcut has trivial influence on the gradient stability, and FixupIni
leads to lower gradient stability than BN. This seems to suggest a link between gradient stability
and F robustness. However, IN/LN/GN also reduces the robustness while they do not lead to strong
gradient stability as BN (See Appendix H). Our work, as the first step towards investigating what
leads to lower F robustness, might inspire more future explorations.
5 DISCUSSION
BN on corruption robustness. One interesting observation from Fig. 1 is that BN is more vulnera-
ble to all corruptions than other normalizations, i.e. IN, LN, GN. The reason can be attributed to the
domain shift (Li et al., 2016) between clean images and corrupted images, which can be mitigated
by rectifying the BN mean and variance with the corrupted images. (see Appendix F).
BN in adversarial training. With standard training, we find that BN increases adversarial vulner-
ability. To improve robustness, adversarial training is one of the most widely used methods. Xie
& Yuille showed that BN might prevent networks from obtaining strong robustness in adversarial
training. However, this is only true when clean images are utilized in the training and the reason is
attributed to the two-domain hypothesis. For standard adversarial training (Madry et al., 2017) with
only adversarial images, as shown in Fig. 4, BN is found to have no influence on LIGS as well as
robust accuracy. This is reasonable because adversarial training explicitly discards NRFs.
BN with FGSM attack. Motivated by the (local) linearity assumption, Goodfellow et al. pro-
posed one-step FGSM attack. FGSM efficiently attacks the model but is not as effective as PGD
attack (Madry et al., 2017) because the DNN is not fully linear. With iterative nature to overcome
this linearity assumption, PGD is a very strong attack and de facto benchmark standard for evaluat-
ing the adversarial robustness, due to which PGD is adopted in our work. Here, we discuss the effect
of BN with FGSM. BN reduces the LIGS value, which indicates the model with BN has low local
linearity. Since the success of FGSM is highly dependent on the linearity assumption, FGSM attack
is conjectured to be less effective on the model with BN than w/o BN. This conjecture is supported
by the results in Appendix G.
6 CONCLUSION
We found that BN and other normalizations increase adversarial vulnerability in standard training
and the reason can be attributed to they shift the model to rely more on NRFs with the evidences
from adversarial robustness, corruption robustness and feature transferability. Among different nor-
malizations, we found IN often leads to a model that the least robust. We are the first to investigate
and successfully disentangle usefulness and robustness of model features. With the disentangled
interpretation, we found (a) BN and IN/LN/GN decreases the F robustness, explaining why they
lead to lower robust accuracy despite higher clean accuracy; (b) the model learns first RFs and then
NRFs because RFs features are essential for training the model in the early stage; (c) BN is cru-
cial for learning NRFs, especially, when the dataset only has NRFs. (d) other network structure
and optimization factors have no significant influence on F robustness, leaving normalization as
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the only factor found to have significant and consistent influence on the F robustness; (g) ResNet
shortcut and Fixup initialization does not lead to lower LIGS, suggesting stabilizing training does
not necessarily lead to learning more NRFs.i.e. lower LIGS.
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A RELATION TO FREQUENCY PERSPECTIVE
Our work focuses on the feature perspective (Ilyas et al., 2019) to analyze the model robustness. A
Fourier perspective on robustness is introduced in (Yin et al., 2019). With the analysis of corruption
analysis in Sec. 3.2, our explanation from the feature perspective is “noise corruptions mainly cor-
rupt the NRFs while contrast and fog mainly corrupt the RFs”. Their explanation from the frequency
perspective can be summarized as: noise corruptions mainly corrupt the high-frequency (HF) fea-
tures while contrast and fog mainly corrupt the low-frequency (LF). These two explanations align
well with each other in the sense that NRFs are widely recognized to have HF property, which mo-
tivated the exploration of several defense methods Das et al. (2018); Liu et al. (2019). Moreover,
our work is the first to demonstrate that the model learns the order from RFs to NRFs. Meanwhile,
it has been shown in (Xu et al., 2019) that the model learns first LF component then HF component,
which aligns well with our finding by perceiving NRFs having HF property
B EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
B.1 SETUP FOR TRAINING MODELS IN SEC. 3.2
The models for CIFAR10 and SVHN used in Sec. 3.2 were trained with SGD with the training pa-
rameters listed in Table 4. The ResNet50 models in Table 1 and Table 2 were trained for 350 epochs
with an initial learning rate of 0.1, which was decreased by a factor of 10 at epochs 150 and 250,
while the other parameters are the same as before. For ImageNet, the VGG models were obtained
from the torchvision library, while the ResNet models are trained with the same parameters as
in (He et al., 2016).
Table 4: Parameters to train a standard model on CIFAR10/SVHN
Parameter Value
Learning rate 0.01
Batch size 128
Weight Decay 5 · 10−4
Epochs 300
Learning rate decay epochs 200
Learning rate decay factor 0.1
For robust models in Table 3 We follow the adversarial training strategy from (Madry et al., 2017)
with l2-PGD and we list the parameters in Table 5.
B.2 PGD ATTACK FOR EVALUATING THE ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS
In Table 1, we evaluate the robustness of models with the l2 and l∞ variants of the PGD-
attack (Madry et al., 2017) and Carlini & Wagner (CW) attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017). For
the l2 and l∞ attack we use  = 0.25 and  = 1/255 for images within a pixel range of [0, 1],
respectively. The attacks are run for 20 iteration steps and we calculate the step size with 2.5/steps.
For the CW-attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017), we follow (Zhang & Wang, 2019) to adopt the PGD
approach with the CW loss and the same hyper parameters as above.
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Table 5: Training parameters for adversarial training for CIFAR10/SVHN
Parameter Value
Learning rate 0.01
Batch size 128
Weight Decay 5 · 10−4
Epochs 150
Learning rate decay epochs 100
Learning rate decay factor 0.1
PGD-variant l2
PGD step size (α) 0.1
PGD perturbation magnitude () 0.5
PGD iterations 7
The robust accuracy values in all figures in Sec 4 are obtained with l2-PGD as above, but for 10
iteration steps on 1000 evaluation samples (100 samples per class) to reduce computation cost.
B.3 EXTRACTING FEATURES AS A DATASET FROM A MODEL
To demonstrate feature transferability in Table 3, we extract features from standard and adversarially
trained models as a dataset. We follow the procedure and hyperparameter choices in (Ilyas et al.,
2019) and generate dataset Dˆ, given a model C:
E(x,y)∼Dˆ[y · f(x)] =
{
E(x,y)∼D[y · f(x)] if f ∈ FC
0 otherwise,
(2)
where FC is the set of features utilized by C. The set of activations in the penultimate layer g(x)
corresponds to FC in the case of DNNs. Thus, to extract the robust features from C we perform the
following optimization:
min
δ
||g(x)− g(x′ + δ)||2. (3)
The optimization is performed for each sample x from D. Likewise, x′ is drawn from D but with
a label other than that of x. The optimization process is realized using the l2 variant of PGD. We
set the step size to 0.1 and the number of iterations to 1000 and we do not apply a restriction on the
perturbation magnitude .
B.4 LIGS METRIC
By default the LIGS values are calculated with ν being set to Gaussian noise with mean µ = 0 and
standard deviation σ = 0.01. In Figure 2 the, ν is set to either Gaussian noise, uniform noise in the
range of [−0.01, 0, 01], FGSM wit  = 0.01 or l∞-PGD with  = 0.01, 7 step iterations and a step
size of 2.5/steps.
C INFLUENCE OF OTHER NORMALIZATION TECHNIQUES ON LIGS
In Fig. 3, we show the influence of BN on the robust accuracy and LIGS over the model training
process. Additionally, Fig. 10 shows the results of repeating this experiment with IN, LN, and GN.
Similar trends to those of BN are observed.
D RESULTS ON IMAGENET WITH LIGS TREND
Fig. 11 shows the influence of normalization for models trained on ImageNet. It can be observed
that the model with IN always exhibits the lowest accuracy, while the model with BN has the highest
accuracy. Similar to the results on CIFAR10, BN/IN/LN/GN consistently leads to lower LIGS.
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Figure 10: Trend of clean accuracy (top), robust accuracy (middle), LIGS (bottom) for ResNet18 on
CIFAR10 with different normalization techniques (IN, LN, GN) applied.
Figure 11: Comparison of different normalization techniques for ResNet18 (top) and ResNet50
(bottom) trained on ImageNet.
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Table 6: Hyperparameters for training the extracted datasets
Dataset LR Batch size LR Drop Data Aug. Momentum Weight Decay
D̂R 0.01 128 Yes Yes 0.9 5 · 10−4
D̂NR 0.01 128 Yes Yes 0.9 5 · 10−4
D̂rand 0.01 128 Yes Yes 0.9 5 · 10−4
D̂det 0.1 128 Yes No 0.9 5 · 10−4
D̂conflict 0.1 128 Yes No 0.9 5 · 10−4
E DESCRIPTION OF D̂R/ D̂NR/ D̂rand/ D̂det
Ilyas et al. introduced a methodology to extract feature datasets from models. In particular the
datasets D̂R, D̂NR, D̂rand and D̂det were introduced, which we will describe here briefly. D̂R
indicates a dataset containing mainly RFs relevant to a robust model, and D̂NR indicates that with
standard model. During the extraction of D̂NR, the magnitude  was not constraint, thus D̂NR has
both RFs and NRFs. D̂rand and D̂det are datasets consisting of “useful” NRFs represented through
adversarial examples for a standard model. The target classes of D̂rand were chosen randomly, while
the ones for D̂det were selected with an offset of t+1 to the original sample ground-truth class. Note
that these datasets are labeled with the target class for which the adversarial example was generated.
We follow the procedure described in Ilyas et al. (2019) and extract the datasets from a ResNet50
model. The hyperparameters used to train a model on one of the above datasets are listed in Table 6.
We use SGD as an optimizer and train the models for 150 epochs with a learning rate decrease by a
factor of 10 at epochs 50 and 100.
Fig. 12 shows the trends for training ResNet18 on D̂R, D̂NR and D̂rand. As seen before, the model
trained on D̂R achieves a relatively high LIGS, while the model trained on D̂rand exhibits relatively
low LIGS values. The LIGS values for the model trained on D̂NR are in the middle of D̂R and
D̂rand, which is expected because D̂NR has RFs and NRFs.
Figure 12: Comparison of D̂R, D̂NR and D̂rand
Fig. 7 shows the trends for training a ResNet18 on D̂Conflict, consisting of conflicting features.
D̂Conflict differs from D̂det in that it draws x′ from a robust dataset D̂R instead of D. The same
experiment with D̂det is shown in Fig. 13. The results resemble those of D̂Conflict. However, we
used D̂Conflict to avoid the influence of the NRFs in D.
F BN STATISTICS ADAPTATION
In our discussion, we indicated that a domain shift between clean images and corrupted images can
exist. This shift can be mitigated by adapting the BN statistics. Using the approach proposed in (Li
et al., 2016), we adapt the BN statistics for the CIFAR10-C dataset instead of the target domain
samples. The results are presented in Table 7, where the adaptation of the BN statistics leads to a
boost of 8% for a VGG-16 and ResNet-18 model on CIFAR10-C.
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Figure 13: Result on D̂det
Table 7: Adapting the BN statistics on CIFAR10-C
Model Clean Accuracy Adapted Accuracy
VGG-16 71.9 79.4
ResNet-18 73.9 82.3
G EVALUATING ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS WITH FGSM ATTACK
As shown in Table. 8, we find that with FGSM attack, the model with BN has higher adversarial
robustness than that w/o BN.
Table 8: Robust accuracy comparison of models with and w/o BN under FGSM attack
Network Acc FGSM
4/255
VGG11 (None) 90.06 32.51
VGG11 (BN) 92.48 40.86
VGG16 (None) 91.89 23.26
VGG16 (BN) 93.7 51.28
ResNet50 (None) 92.15 28.23
ResNet50 (BN) 95.6 38.07
H VISUALIZATION OF OPTIMIZATION LANDSCAPE
Following (Santurkar et al., 2018), we visualize the optimization landscape. The results on ResNet18
and VGG16 are shown in Fig.14 and Fig.15, respectively. On ResNet18, only BN leads to more
predictive and stable gradient; on ResNet50, BN/IN/LN/GN lead to a more stable gradient, however,
the the effect of IN/LN/GN is significantly smaller than that of BN. The results demonstrating the
influence of shortcut are shown in Fig.16 where shortcut is found to have trivial influence on the
gradient stability. The results comparing FixupIni and BN are shown in Fig.17, where FixupIni
leads to less stable gradient than BN.
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Figure 14: Optimization landscape of ResNet18 with and without normalization. Variation in loss
(left); l2 gradient change (center); β-smoothness (right).
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Figure 15: Optimization landscape of VGG16 with and without BN. Variation in loss (left); l2
gradient change (center); β-smoothness (right).
Figure 16: ResNet18 Shortcut comparison
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Figure 17: Comparison of BN and FixupIni on Resnet20 (top) and ResNet56 (bottom)
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